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This paper examines how the interplay between political, economic and technological factors 
in China has resulted in the taming of critical journalism since the rule of Xi Jinping in 2012. 
While trying to reduce ideological ambiguity and revive Maoist ideology, the authorities 
operate overt and covert mechanisms of media control that dramatically limit reporting 
space. Market and digital communication technologies are currently contributing to 
tightening media control by worsening the context for critical journalism. The threat of the 
market to critical journalism that began in the early twenty-first century has deepened. The 
capitalisation of digital platforms, outperforming the empowering potential of digital 
communication technologies, has led to the pursuit of entertainment and capital in the 
media environment where critical journalism is practised. A hostile political climate and the 
pursuit of profit have radically diminished the necessary conditions for sustaining critical 
journalism. With this institutional crisis, critical journalism has little capacity and foundation 
to struggle with the party-state over reporting space. In this case, therefore, with neither the 
market nor digital media technologies being a liberalising force, they have  helped the state 
to wield political power and to consolidate media control. 







    In their efforts to explore the influence of digital communication technologies on 
journalism, scholars (e.g. Pavlik 2000; Stanyer 2009; Zelizer 2009; Örnebring 2010; 
Paulussen 2012; Cummings 2014; Macgregor 2014; Ashuri 2016; Alexander, Breese, and 
Luengo 2016) largely consider economic and technological forces but leave the intrusive 
power of the state unexamined. This is largely because most studies examine journalism in 
Western democracies where the state plays a relatively weak role in influencing journalism 
(Waisbord 2007). The situation however is different when it comes to journalism in 
authoritarian systems such as China, where the state controls journalism and media, 
alongside the influence of flourishing economic markets in journalism. The pervasiveness of 
digital communication technologies – the internet, Web 2.0 tools, and removable electronic 
devices such as smart phones, iPhones, and iPads – leads to an interesting question: 
Whether and to what extent the wide application of digital communication technologies in 
authoritarian societies will help to transform journalism in a way that opposes the control of 
the state and mitigates commercial influences on journalism? 
    This article1  gives a negative answer to the question by offering an interpretive analysis of 
how the interplay between political, economic and technological factors has tamed critical 
journalism in China since the regime of Xi Jinping in 2012. While trying to reduce ideological 
ambiguity and revive Maoist ideology, the authorities operate overt and covert mechanics 
of media control that dramatically limit reporting space.  Unlike in the Jiang and Hu eras, 
where the market and digital communication technologies created space for journalistic 
autonomy, in the Xi era, they are currently contributing to tightening media control by 
worsening the situation for critical journalism. The threat of the market to critical journalism 
that started in the early twenty-first century has been deepened. The capitalisation of digital 
platforms, outperforming the empowering potential of digital communication technologies, 
has led to the pursuit of entertainment and capital in the media environment where critical 
journalism is practised. The combination of hostile political climate and pressing profit 
pursuit has radically diminished the necessary conditions for sustaining critical journalism. 
With this institutional crisis, critical journalism has little capacity and foundation to struggle 
with the party-state over reporting space. In this case, therefore, the market and digital 
media technologies, since neither is a liberalising force, have helped the state to wield 
political power and to consolidate media control. 
    The making of critical journalism: pushing reporting boundaries 
    Critical journalism in China pushes against the limits on reporting. Emerging in the 1990s, 
the practice of pushing reporting boundaries was largely found in relatively critical and 
liberal news outlets – especially those commercial print media supporting critical reporting 
and investigative journalism, such as the Southern Weekend (nanfang zhoumo), the 
Southern Metropolitan Daily (nanfang dushibao) and the Xinkuai Daily (xinkuaibao) in 
Guangzhou, the Beijing News (xinjingbao), the Beijing Youth (beijing qingnianbao), the 
Caijing Magazine in Beijing and the Huashang Daily (huashangbao) in Xi’an. It was also seen 
in daily reporting on politically sensitive topics, such as current affairs and social issues.  
The making of critical journalism in China took place in the media marketisation process 
starting from the 1980s and was later facilitated by the adoption of digital communication 
technologies in the early twenty-first century, most of which fell within the rule of Jiang 
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Zemin and Hu Jintao. Although some scholars (e.g. Lee, He, and Huang 2006; Tong and 
Sparks 2009; Tong 2013) recognised that the market could act as a constraining force at 
times, the majority of the studies (e.g. Zhou 2000; Zhao 2000; Pan 2000; Liebman 2005, Lee 
2005, Hassid 2008; Tong 2011, Bandurski and Hala 2010; Svensson, Saether, and Zhang 2014; 
Hassid and Repnikova 2016) argued that Chinese journalists had gained some leeway to 
push reporting boundaries following the introduction of the market. Journalists were able to 
report on a wider range of social, economic and political issues than they could cover in the 
past; and their reports were more in the interest of readers than in that of the party-state. 
Journalists strove so hard to make the most of the manoeuvring space released by market 
forces that pushing reporting boundaries was integrated into their daily journalistic practice. 
Later on, the introduction of digital communication technologies further enlarged the space 
for journalism. These developments mostly explain important changes in Chinese journalism 
after the 1980s, such as the rise of critical reporting and investigative journalism in the 
1990s (Zhao 2000; de Burgh 2003). In the twenty-first century, although it has encountered 
challenges, critical journalism continues to be practised (Tong 2015; Svensson, Saether, and 
Zhang 2014; Wang and Lee 2014; Hassid and Repnikova 2016; Repnikova 2017). 
A number of reasons explain why this has happened. The desire of journalists to achieve 
independence and journalistic autonomy drove them to circumvent constraints and grasp 
opportunities to achieve greater reporting freedom. Commercial news outlets supported 
their journalists because critical reporting and investigative journalism could help to 
maximise profits (Tong and Sparks 2009). In addition, the existence of complexity and even 
contradictions in political authority created opportunities for these journalists. For example, 
the decentralisation in the relationship between central and local government generated a 
vacuum for practising critical reporting and investigative journalism (Tong 2010). On top of 
these, journalists pushing boundaries of reporting space benefited from the dissonance that 
appeared in ideology as a result of the 1980s economic and media reform (Zhou 2000; Zhao 
2000; Wang 2003). The once dominant Maoist ideology was dying and the party-state faced 
a crisis in ideology. With the rise of other ideologies such as market liberalism and 
neoliberalism, there was a juxtaposition of different ideologies.  
The extensive adoption of digital communication technologies in Chinese society has also 
been regarded as empowering journalists in reporting on politically sensitive issues (Hassid 
and Repnikova 2016) and therefore increasing the critical capacity of journalists in pushing 
reporting boundaries. Online discussions offer endless story tips and news sources for 
journalists; the great volume of user-generated content published by ordinary internet users 
disseminates widely the products of journalism and enlarges their social influence. The 
online dissemination of critical and investigative reports would increase political protection 
for journalists and reduce political interference in journalistic practice. Quite a number of 
reports went viral after publication, putting the authorities under pressure, and changed the 
development of the events. The case of Sun Zhigang2 is one of the most significant. But this 
situation has entirely changed since Xi Jingping came to power. 
    Xi’s ideological struggles and media policies 
    Xi’s tenure has two noticeable features: blatant ideological struggles and unsympathetic 
hardline media policies. After 2012, changes took place with respect to ideology, along with 
a series of political campaigns against Xi’s political rivals and dissenters, as well as hardening 
attitudes toward news media and journalism. This reflected a compelling revival and 
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reappropriation of Maoist ideology and less ambiguity in ideology (Yang 2014; Zhao 2016). 
Despite not being the sole ideology, Maoist ideology now enjoys more prominence than in 
the Jiang and Hu-Wen eras, leading to a collapse in the political basis for practising critical 
journalism in the Xi period.  
The reestablishment of politically correct ideology is as important as economic goals for Xi 
Jinping (Lam 2015: xiv), as there is a need to establish a consistent and coherent image 
about the leadership. For this reason, no dissidents that may challenge this image can be 
tolerated. This explains why Xi launched the nationwide corruption campaigns, most famous 
of which were those against Xi’s political rival – Bo Xilai – and high-ranking officials such as 
Wang Lijun and Zhou Kangliang in Bo’s faction. These campaigns bear the hallmark of 
ideological struggles, as shown in the Bo Xilai case (Meng 2016). Given the function of 
journalism as ideological apparatus, regaining ideological unity and shutting down 
ideological dissonance would need the cooperation of journalism, which is one primary 
reason Xi has adopted a hostile and harsh stance towards news media and journalism.  
There are also societal factors underlining the iron fist of Xi. These factors include the 
rising prominence of ‘urban diseases’3, such as increasing congestion, rocketing house prices, 
and pollution, which worsens the pre-existing social problems such as social inequality and 
corruption. Moreover, the intensification of ethnic tensions, especially the tension between 
Han and Uighur, as reflected in a series of terrorist attacks occurring in Tian'an'men Square4 
in Beijing in 2013 and in the train station in Kunming5 in 2014, combine to pressure the new 
leadership.  
The hard line adopted by Xi can also be attributed to the noticeably divided public 
discourses before 2012. There were fierce debates on political and public issues between 
China's pro-government news media such as Global Affairs (huanqiu shibao); and 
commercial liberal news media such as the Southern Weekend, the Southern Metropolitan 
Daily, and the Beijing News. Different perspectives on these issues have been played out on 
the internet. In addition, influential events such as the case of Qian Yunhui6 in 2010, the 
case of the Wukan protest and democratic reform7 in 2011 and the case of Tang Hui8 in 
2012, triggered fierce debate among different players – especially on the internet among 
both those on the left and right. It is possible that this situation had become the major 
concern of the central leadership by the time he came to office and the fear of losing 
ideological and political control explains the tightening of control over media.  
Unlike the media control of Hu Jingtao which was loose at the beginning but tightened 
later on, Xi Jinping immediately tightened control over freedom of expression and media as 
soon as he came to power as president in 2012. He commanded journalists to report in a 
politically correct manner and in a way that can help to realise his “Chinese Dream” 
(zhongguo meng) (Li and Sparks 2016). His attitude toward freedom of expression was well 
demonstrated in his speech at the National Propaganda and Thoughts Conference in August 
2013. In his speech, he expressed his determination to stress the importance of ideological 
work, and promoted the idea of ‘propaganda struggle’ (yulun douzhen). After his speech, 
the ideas of ‘propaganda struggle’ and ‘ideological struggle’ dominated in the coverage of 
party organs and the discourses of local officials. This speech and the promulgation of this 
concept suggest the hardline policies of Xi toward propaganda and thought work as well as 
the increasingly tightened media control. In the party’s news and propaganda meeting on 
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19 February 2016, Xi restressed his ideological priority by claiming that the news media 
owned by the party and government should consider its ‘surname’ to be the party (meiti 
xingdang), i.e. news media should consider itself so intimately linked to the party. 9 
    A nationwide online ‘purge’ started immediately after Xi's speech in 2013. Hundreds of 
internet users were arrested for their online expressions. Among those placed under arrest 
were those influential Weibo users who have millions of followers and actively participated 
in critical discussions on political and public issues and anti-corruption campaigns. In 2014, 
more than 33 ‘public accounts’ (gonggong zhanghao) on WebChat that deliver content 
generated by users directly to the mobiles of subscribers were banned. After the Kunming 
train station terror attack in 2014, several influential Weibo users such as Li Chengpeng and 
Luo Cangping received warnings from the police in Beijing. Political dissents or ‘wrongdoers’ 
such as Xuan Manzi, Peter Humphrey (2013)10, Lam Wing Kee (2016)11 and Gui Minhai 
(2016),12 or journalists such as Chen Yongzhou of the Xinkuai Daily and Shen Hao of the 21st 
Century Economic Report appeared in TV confessions and were disgraced. In 2017, the 
Internet News and Information Regulation banned non-public capital (fei gongyou ziben) 
from sponsoring online news and editing services. Under this regulation, any online 
platforms such as websites, blogs, WeChat or Weibo accounts had to apply for and obtain 
government permission before they could disseminate news information to the public.13 
These actions constitute severe control over self-publishing (zimeiti) in which ordinary 
internet users publish their own media content to their followers, and in some cases, seek 
crowdfunding. 
   Difficulties and crackdowns on traditional news media after 2012 include the shutting 
down of the Yanhuang Chunqiu magazine's website and the crackdown on the Xinkuai Daily. 
Media practitioners and observers have described 2013 as the coldest winter for news 
media over the past 20 years. On 1 March 2016, the Southern Metropolitan Daily was 
criticised for the following acrostic: ‘With the surname of the Party, the ghosts of news 
media return to the sea’ (meiti xingdang hungui dahai)’, which implies that Xi Jinping’s 
command for news media to have the party as their surname is killing news media. The on-
duty editor was fired and the deputy editor-in-chief received an administrative penalty. In 
2016, an open letter that was published on the website of Wujie (www.watching.cn) – an 
online news outlet launched in 2015 and jointly funded by the Xinjiang propaganda 
department, Alibaba.com and the Caixun group – went viral online. Although this letter was 
removed quickly, several journalists, including the executive editor were detained. These 
events indicate the tightening of control over news media targeted those critical news 
outlets that embraced commentary and investigative journalism (Li and Sparks 2016) as well 
as being an attempt to consolidate ideological control. The space for free expression and 
journalistic autonomy has shrunk severely.  
    The construction of the image of unethical critical journalism  
    Apart from the overt media control discussed above, the party-state has also been 
successful in constructing an unethical image for those news outlets that are well-known for 
their critical journalism. Amongst them are the Southern Weekend, the Southern 
Metropolitan Daily, the Caijing Magazine, the Xinkuai Daily and the 21st Century Business 
Report. Seen as practising the best journalism in China, they represent the intellectual 
conscience and promotion of justice that fearlessly opposes authority. This image 
distinguishes them from other news organisations practising party journalism or merely 
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tabloid journalism, and is the source of the legitimacy of critical journalism. The construction 
of an unethical image for critical journalism shakes the basis of this legitimacy and is thus 
the strongest blow the party-state would land on these news outlets.  
    The process of constructing an unethical image for critical journalism started in 2013 and 
was completed in 2015. The year 2013 is marked by the case of Liu Wei of the Southern 
Metropolitan Daily14, and the New Year Editorial Event of the Southern Weekend. In January, 
several commonsense errors were spotted in the New Year Editorial published by the 
Southern Weekend. The journalists and editors of the weekly accredited the errors to the 
interference of the Guangdong provincial propaganda department, as the latter extensively 
revised the editorial and published it without having it gone through the normal editorial 
process. The journalists and editors protested publicly against the censorship. They 
threatened to all quit if the senior staff would not resist pressure from the state, and if local 
political authorities continued to interfere so overtly in their journalistic work. A large 
number of people gathered and protested in front of the press group headquarters in 
support these journalists. However, at the end of 2013, it was revealed that the senior 
editors of the weekly had given testimony to local police that was thought to have lead to 
the arrest of several citizens who protested openly in support of the weekly at the beginning 
of the year. The disclosure of this information immediately ignited public anger toward the 
weekly and they accused it of betraying the public as well as journalistic professionalism. 
These events overthrew the image of the Southern Weekend as representing public 
conscience and justice. 
   The construction of the notion of ‘unethical’ critical journalism was accomplished in 2015, 
when a number of journalists were arrested for their alleged unethical practices – either 
corruption or threatening national stability and security. The Chen Yongzhou case is typical 
of this. In 2015, following the publication of his article criticising a commercial company, he 
was soon arrested and detained by police from another province. His employer, the Xinkuai 
Daily, published open letters on its front page for two days urging the police to release Chen. 
However, later on, Chen appeared in a CCTV news programme confessing his guilt and 
admitting he had accepted a bribe from a rival of the commercial company. The Xinkuai 
Daily was required to reconfigure its management staff and its editor-in-chief was removed 
from position. In another case, Shen Hao of the 21st Century Business Report (21shiji jingji 
baodao), who was seen as a ‘godfather’ of critical journalism in China, confessed on 
television that he too was corrupt. The case of Shen Hao is seen by observers as marking 
‘end of an era for Chinese journalism’ (Denyer 2015). Ethical issues such as red envelopes 
(hongbao) have been a grey area in Chinese journalism (Zhao 1998; Zhang 2009). However, 
a crackdown on media corruption can be used to crack down on critical journalism, as 
exemplified in the aftermath of the Sun Zhigang case (Hassid 2010). From Chen Yongzhou to 
Shen Hao, no matter what the truth is, the authorities successfully managed to portray an 
image to the public of critical journalism as being unethical. This justified the apparent need 
for the party-state to regulate – in fact control and censor – journalism.  
    The market failure of commercial newspapers 
    The threat of the market to critical journalism, which started to appear in the early 
twenty-first century as exemplified in the case of the Dahe Daily (Tong 2013; Tong and 
Sparks 2009), has been exacerbated. The failure of news organisations in media markets 
worsens the whole situation for critical journalism. Advertising and circulation incomes have 
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been migrating to the internet. In 2016, for example, compared to the same time in 2015, 
the first three-quarters of the year saw the advertising income of traditional news media 
drop by 5.5%. However, online advertising investment steadily increased 39.1% in the first 
quarter of 2016, 34.5% in the second quarter, and 33% in the third quarter (Guo and Hu 
2017). As a response to the new environment, large news organisations such as the 
Southern Metropolitan Daily have been conducting a range of multimedia experiments, 
which however have not successfully generated decent financial rewards. 
Financial turmoil has engulfed commercial newspapers, many of which started to run 
severe financial deficits in the second decade of the twenty-first century. The comments of 
Interviewee A of Newspaper A, which has a reputation for critical reporting and 
investigative journalism, are illustrative: in the past, advertising income mainly came from 
real estate and cars. Although real estate agents were still buying advertising space in the 
newspaper, car advertising declined in 2013, plunged in 2014, and could hardly be seen at 
all in 2015. Instead, advertisers prefer to place their car advertisements online. A direct 
consequence of this is the cancellation of the newspaper’s entire car magazine to reduce 
the cost of publishing (interview, 19 April 2015).  
The market failure of commercial newspapers has led to a reduction in the income of 
journalists and the closures of newspapers. During the golden days of commercial news 
media in the 1990s and the early twenty-first century, the salaries of their journalists were 
considered decent. However, their income stopped increasing and even began to decline 
due to the financial deficits being experienced by their news organisations.15  In addition, 
the downsizing and even closure of news outlets became evident particularly from 2014; 
they included the News Evening (Xinwen Wanbao), the New Everyday (tiantian Xinbao) 
(both were shut down in 2014), the Hebei Youth (hebei qingnianbao), the Today Morning 
(jinri zaobao), the Jinghua Times (jinghua shibao) and the Oriential Morning (dongfang 
zaofan) (all closed down in 2016). A ramification of this turmoil is the departure of a large 
number of journalists working in commercial newspapers for other careers. Among them 
were many who were likely to push reporting boundaries.  
By contrast, party organs have not been affected much by the market. In fact, they have 
even been revived due to the return of financial subsidies from the government which were 
abolished during the 1980s media reform. Returning to the embrace of the government 
turns out to be a realistic way of surviving. A number of party organs (and on some 
occasions also commercial newspapers) at different administrative levels (from central to 
municipal) started to receive significant financial subsidies from their local governments 
over the past few years (Guo and Hu 2017). For example, from 2014, the Shanghai Press 
Group begun to receive an annual financial subsidy of RMB50 million from the Shanghai 
municipal government.16 This is appraised by some domestic scholars as enabling the press 
group to deal with market pressure, make the most of all available social resources and 
ensuring its dominance in constructing mainstream ideological discourses; meanwhile 
however this indicates the reiteration and reinforcement of the political nature of the 
Shanghai Press Group as the party’s organ (Wu et al. 2014). From 2013 to 2015, the 
Guangdong provincial government assigned RMB70 million annually to the Southern Daily, 
RMB50 million to the Yangcheng Evening and RMB30 million to the Guangdong TV. In 2016 
the Guangdong Daily received RMB350 million from the Guangdong Financial Department 
after suffering from severe financial deficit from 2014. Apart from those in Guangdong and 
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Shanghai, party organs in Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Chongqing all received substantial financial 
subsidies over the last few years (Guo and Hu 2017). Therefore, the impact of market failure 
falls mostly on commercial news outlets rather than on party organs that are under the 
protection of the party-state. Critical news outlets, which are often commercial news media, 
are thus suffering both political and financial pressures. In this sense, their market failure 
weakens their critical capacity as they are losing the economic basis that enables them to 
resist the interference of the party-state. In addition, these commercial newspapers are 
usually ‘children’ newspapers (zibao) of party organs. Therefore, when their ‘mother’ party 
organs (mubao) have started to receive financial subsidies from government, these ‘children’ 
newspapers are expected to behave.  
    The implications of the capitalisation of content-based digital platforms 
    The capitalisation of digital platforms, which is also called platform capitalism and is part 
of the ‘capitalisation of digital economic circulation’ (Langley and Leyshon 2016), has 
transformed the media environment into one that prioritises the pursuit of entertainment 
and capital. China has entered an era in which hosts on Douyu TV, UP live or Panda TV (all 
are online streaming platforms), can easily earn up to ‘100,000 yuan (US$14,537) a month 
on UpLive’ by live broadcasting their own videos on trivial things such as an online 
streaming video about a pretty women changing clothes (Jing 2017), and an era in which 
everyone cares much more about money than about civil society. The market failure of 
commercial newspapers has taken place exactly in this environment, which is hostile overall 
to critical journalism. 
    The internet was introduced to China in the mid-1990s and since then has developed 
dramatically in terms of infrastructure and the level of penetration into the population. By 
the end of 2016, China had had 7310 million internet users (CNNIC 2017),17 who form huge 
markets with great economic potential. In the early twenty-first century, the influence of 
internet-mediated digital communication on journalism largely referred to the rise of citizen 
journalism, user-generated content (UGC) and online news providers, which however were 
not allowed to produce their own news, such as Tencent News (tengxun xinwens), and Top 
News Today (jinri toutiao). These new players broke down the monopoly of journalism on 
information production and dissemination and took away the advertising revenues of 
traditional news media.   
    Over recent years, the influence of digital communication on journalism was amplified 
while the capitalisation of digital platforms was deepened and expanded from commerce to 
content. Digital economy, as represented in the commercial success of B2B (business to 
business) or C2C (consumer to consumer) platforms such as Alibaba.com and Tencent, 
started to boom in China from the beginning of the new century (Dai 2002; Tan et al. 2015). 
At the beginning, successful platforms were mainly those enabling buyers and sellers to 
exchange commodities directly. Later on, since information and messages circulating on 
social network sites was proved able to be monetized (Peitz and Valletti 2015; Keady 2014), 
content-based digital platforms, especially social media platforms and applications, have 
been capitalised. This leads to the capitalisation of digital communication on these 
platforms. This tendency is exemplified in the wave of start-up businesses publishing media 
content (neirong chuangye). This is a combination of business start-up and ‘self-publishing’ 
(zimeiti) operated by individuals or small companies, which receive funding mainly in three 
ways: (venture) capital investment; advertising; and ‘rewards or donation’ (dashang), which 
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is a crowdfunding function on social media such as WeChat, Weibo, Douban, Douyu TV and 
UPLive.18 This trend of starting up businesses to publish content was initiated by the central 
government. In 2015, the State Council of China issued its decision to prioritise and sponsor 
mass business start-ups.19  China since then has witnessed a new wave of business start-ups 
and entrepreneurism since the economic reform of the 1980s. As observed by the People’s 
Daily, there is a ‘heat of all people becoming entrepreneurs and starting business’ (quanmin 
chuangye).20 The publishing content business start-up (neirong chuangye) is one main 
category of such business start-ups.  
The phenomenon of ‘self-publishing’ has boomed in recent years with the popularity of 
social media applications, especially WeChat. At first, some veteran journalists or 
investigative journalists who were removed from jobs were supported by crowdfunding and 
started to ‘self-publish’ their reports on significant social and political events. Liu Jianfeng 
for example observed and wrote about the Wukan protest in 2011 and relied on internet 
crowdfunding for a number of his journalistic projects. Journalists or former journalists were 
a significant group that actively operated their ‘public accounts’ (gongzhonghao) to earn 
extra money or to do it for living. In some other cases, however, public accounts or 
applications were launched in order to attract capitalist investment, which is a prominent 
part of the capitalisation of content-based digital platforms. The application Muzhi Yuedu 
(literally ‘thumb reading’) was a good example. A group of veteran investigative journalists 
started to launch this application from around 2012 and established it as a successful 
application where readers can share reading experiences with one another. In 2015, the 
founder Zuo Zhijian sold the platform to the Jingdong Group.21 
Over the past few years, this journalist-centred phenomenon expanded to ordinary 
internet users. They started their businesses by raising money from publishing content on 
their own ‘public accounts’ on WeChat or other platforms. Content published is either 
written by the account owners or disseminated/forwarded by them on behalf of advertisers. 
Types of such content range from news to features to charity fundraising posts. This 
significantly blurs the distinction between advertising and content on platforms. Content 
refers not only to articles or photos but also to broadcasting content. Since being launched 
in 2014 or 2015, online streaming platforms such as Douyu TV, UP Live, and Panda TV that 
enable users to broadcast their self-made content online have become extremely popular 
among online users, especially young people who were born in or after the 1990s. The 
prevalence of mobile technologies lowers the requirements for making broadcasting 
content and enables them to start up their own content-based business. The number of 
online video users grew 8.1% from 2015 to 2016 (CNNIC 2017). Driven by capital, online 
streaming platforms developed rapidly in 2016 with user numbers increasing to 344 million 
by December 2016, which is 47.1% of the total number of internet users (CNNIC 2017). 
Advertising income in these platforms was considerable in 2016 (CNNIC 2017). Momo, an 
online streaming platform, for example, published its financial data for the fourth quarter of 
2016 which shows its advertising income from its online streaming service was US$194.8 
million and had become its main income. 22 
How much funding an article or a video can receive from readers/audiences relies heavily 
on the popularity of the accounts, which are measured by Web hits, the number of 
followers and the frequency of the content being forwarded.  With the facilitation of online 
paying systems through these platforms, it is common that sensational and yellow accounts 
10 
 
have attracted a huge audience that pay to watch, which has even generated the 
phenomenon of so-called internet celebrities (wanghong), a distorted but profitable 
product of the capitalisation of online platforms in China. Influential UPLive accounts not 
only offer videos that are mostly about games or other entertainment content but also sell 
products or broadcast advertising. Some platforms even offer real-time streaming of 
sensational and porn content.  
This capitalised digital communication environment has a number of negative implications 
for journalism. It is nurturing the formation of segmented reader markets as each and every 
reader can choose which content to receive. The prevalence of ‘public accounts’ also fosters 
the sensational tastes of readers, who are interested in apolitical and entertainment 
content rather than serious reports on social and political issues. The fact that media 
content is sensational and amusing can be attractive to internet users and therefore 
increase the chances of being funded results in the prevalence of tabloidised infotainment 
and voyeuristic content. Such content can take away advertising revenues from traditional 
journalism as it is competing for the attention of readers with mainstream journalism. It will 
also turns readers away from quality journalism (Leibold 2011). The party-state would allow 
the publication of such content as long as it is politically correct and does not challenge the 
party line (Zhang 2011). The rise of such apolitical tastes makes pushing boundaries with the 
party-state less appealing, as there are no real financial rewards for critical journalism.  
In addition, the prevalence of start-up businesses self-publishing content can lure 
journalists away from traditional journalism, who have either started to complain about 
their salaries and lost hope for their career as critical journalists, or wanted to practise 
independent journalism. Independent journalism can be good for Chinese society. However, 
the financial pressures may make them opt to publish infotainment content that is easier to 
get funding for and which is politically safe. Any improper coverage published on the ‘public 
accounts’ of journalists that lack gatekeepers and organisational guidance would eventually 
damage the public image of journalism as a whole. What is worse is that in this money-
worshiping environment the attention of journalists has shifted from practising good 
journalism to making money. From 2015 to the time of writing, for example, the popular 
discourses among the circle of investigative journalists were no longer about who has 
published which influential reports, but about who has attracted funding for their ‘public 
accounts’ or applications. Interviewee B even commented that almost everybody is now 
talking about how to make money rather than to produce good reports (December 1, 2016).  
    Li and Sparks argue that commercial newspapers (especially those that once supported 
critical reporting and investigative journalism) are vulnerable to the application of digital 
technology in distributing news, as demonstrated in the case of the Beijing News (2016). 
This paper however argues that the capitalisation of digital platforms and communication 
entirely destroys the material basis for quality journalism as it has transformed the whole 
environment to something that is uninhabitable for critical journalism. The real threat 
comes from the changed environment and the institutional crisis resulting from the toxic 
combination of the capitalisation of digital platforms and communication as well as the 
unfavourable political and economic cultures.  
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    Critical journalism tamed 
    This unfavourable environment under the joint influence of political, commercial and 
technological factors has led to the taming of critical journalism and news outlets supporting 
critical journalism. For example, Xi’s regime has presided over the fall of Chinese 
investigative journalism (Svensson 2017). Investigative journalism that was once the symbol 
of media freedom and journalism’s critical capacity in China has experienced tough times 
since 2003 and stopped producing any influential reports from around 2013 on, one year 
after Xi came to power. Most investigative teams in news outlets across China including 
those in the Huashang Daily (huashang bao), the China Youth (beijing qingnianbao) and the 
Jinghua Times (jinghua shibao) were closed down. In some other cases, investigative 
journalists were arrested because their reports were thought of as detrimental to national 
stability or security, as exemplified in the case of Wang Xiaolu of the Caijing magazine23 in 
2014 and the case of Liu Wei in 2015 as discussed above.  
    News outlets such as the Southern Weekend, the Southern Metropolitan Daily, the Beijing 
News, the 21st Century Business News and the Xinkuai Daily that were famous for critical 
reporting and investigative journalism have either been on the receiving ends of crackdowns 
or been transformed by removing their editors-in-chief and by changing their culture. A 
common viewpoint emerging in the interviews is that the intervention of the authorities has 
become more severe and what can be reported on now is limited, especially reports about 
important social, political and economic issues and about corruption. Interviewee D of 
Newspaper A said: ‘One very prominent phenomenon is that investigative reporting is dying. 
Less and less people devote themselves to investigative journalism and only very few news 
outlets such as the Caijing Magazien, the Caixin Magazine, and the Paper can publish 
investigative reports’ (5 May, 2015). A ‘spy’ assigned by the local propaganda government 
even spies on their reporting activities. Advertising staff sometimes inform related 
departments or commercial organisations about forthcoming reports or exercise pressure 
on editorial departments. Journalists have started to select those topics and information 
that are most unlikely to be spiked. This is not only for the sake of political safety but also 
about income. Just as Interviewee E said: ‘As a journalist, you should consider your income, 
this is the question you have to face’ (May 29, 2015). According to them, in the past if their 
critical reports were refused for political safety reasons, they would still be paid. This policy 
however was no longer applicable at the time of the interviews.  
Most news outlets that once sponsored critical reporting and investigative journalism 
have already diminished their support for it. Apart from the political considerations, 
concerns over copyright issues and the interests of the readers also discourage news media 
from continuing to support the practice of critical investigative journalism. In-depth critical 
investigative reports cost news organisations dear both financially and politically. With little 
internet regulation and copyright regulation in China, however, what is frequently seen is 
that investigative reports produced by one news organisation are freely published by other 
online media for free or at very low cost. Magazines such as Kantianxia greatly reduce the 
costs for producing in-depth reports by merely rewriting the stories from different angles 
based on investigative reports investigated and published by other news outlets. Being 
dramatically ‘scrounged’ for free makes producing critical and investigative reports as well 




    In addition, as discussed above, a large number of journalists from critical news outlets 
left journalism (Ren 2015). Take the Southern Press Group (nanfang baoye jituan). The 
number of employees who left the group went from 141 in 2012, to 176 in 2013, to 202 in 
2014. Most of them were journalists or editors and worked for the Southern Metropolitan 
Daily, which is renowned for its critical reporting.24 Those working on its investigative 
reporting team during the zenith of Chinese investigative journalism in the late 1990s and 
early twenty-first century nearly all quit journalism for business. These all point to the 
difficulty in persisting to practise investigative journalism and maintain a critical capacity.  
Therefore, although a few years later than their Western counterparts, Chinese 
investigative journalists have eventually started to lament the demise of investigative 
journalism, which is an important genre of critical journalism. In December 2013, the Truth 
(qiushi) channel at the NetEase hosted the ‘Ten Years of In-depth Investigative Reporting in 
China’ forum. Influential investigative journalists from around the country and directors of 
investigative reporting departments at news media outlets gathered and reflected on the 
decade’s long development of investigative journalism, sharing their predictions for the 
future. Two prevailing views among them were, first, in the new century, the past ten years 
from 2003 to 2013 were golden years for investigative journalism; and second, the golden 
years had already gone. Their concerns not only came from the serious issue of political 
control but also originated from the pressures on investigative journalism from new 
media.25  
That journalists gauge newsworthiness increasingly based on the interests of readers – 
mostly internet users – and newsrooms judge the success of a news report by measuring 
Web hits or the frequencies of being forwarded or favoured leaves critical journalism 
vulnerable to the capitalised media environment. A prominent theme arising across these 
interviews is the selection of news now is greatly influenced by their judgement of the 
readers’ interests, reflected on topics of reports receiving considerable Web hits and hot 
topics prevailing online; in other terms, they have started to run after whatever topics might 
attract the attention of readers even though journalists might not think of them as good 
news. Interviewee F who was an investigative journalist at Newspaper A quit critical and 
investigative reporting: ‘I still need to write reports. So I have to run after those online 
trends that can attract eyeballs. If I can write and publish these kinds of reports, my reports 
will have higher hits and our newspaper would think I am doing my job … Most of these 
topics are very everyday and trivial. You can call them news, but not good enough if 
compared to some serious topics that have more value from my perspective. However what 
can we do? All newspapers are reporting on those topics [in the interests of internet users], 
maybe our rival will report [if we do not report on these topics]’ (5 May, 2015). 
   Obviously, the journalists found that what the internet users liked to read were different 
from what they felt newsworthy, and were often about something amusing and even trivial. 
Interviewee G of Newspaper A who was an editor of its apps explained that several news 
items such as the reopening of a bookshop and of a hotel went viral for no reason. They did 
not expect that news like this would become popular and attract a high click rate. The 
newsroom and journalists who used to crave critical news that revealed the dark side of 
society and looked for truth suddenly found topics that go viral easily are either about trivial 
life or are sensational and look like fake news. Therefore they have started to promote this 
kind of news (25 June, 2015). As a result, interviewees agreed that there is a growing 
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tendency towards tabloidization in the coverage of these commercial news media that were 
once critical. This kind of content has even increasingly blurred the distinction between 
news and advertising. According to Interviewee H of Newspaper A who had been working at 
the newspaper for over ten years (May 19 2015), at the time of interview, more than half of 
journalists in the team had been requested to write native advertising by their superiors 
although journalists are very reluctant to do so as this is in conflict with their journalistic 
ethics and personal autonomy. This however would not happen in the past, as their 
organisation endeavoured to separate clearly the advertising department from editorial 
departments and even to resist the interference of advertising in news reporting.  
On top of all these, a symbiotic relationship has come to form between local authorities 
and those commercial news outlets that once sponsored critical reporting and tried to 
remain independent as much as they could. Although not obviously receiving financial 
subsidies from local authorities, some commercial newspapers turn to political authorities 
for sponsorship or collaboration for certain programmes or projects, especially on digital 
platforms. The Southern Metropolitan Daily for example collaborated with the Guangdong 
Provincial Education Bureau (GPEB) and launched a multimedia programme called Southern 
Metropolitcan Education Alliance (nandu jiaoyu lianmeng) in 2017. This follows the 
footprints of its ‘mother’ newspaper: the Southern Daily (nanfang ribao) that signed the 
Education Information Collaboration Agreement (jiaoyun xinxihua hezuo xieyi) with the 
GPEB early the same year.26  Journalism practised at the lower administrative levels 
especially requires support from local government in order to survive the severe financial 
winter. Take an online platform launched by Newspaper C. Interviewee C was responsible 
for launching and operating an online platform that aimed to provide content for local 
residents and was asked to make sure its ends met. The best thing they could do was to 
collaborate with governments for financial sponsorship, political resources and news 
resources / government service (5 May, 2016). This suggests the emergence of a symbiotic 
‘friendship’ between commercial news media and local governments in the digital era; and 
in this new relationship, it would be difficult for journalism to maintain its critical capability 
that is supposed to hold power to account.  
    Conclusion 
    The analysis in this paper offers an example of where the market, the state and digital 
communication technologies have a combining effect on journalism. The case of China 
discussed here has demonstrated that the market and digital communication technologies 
have turned out to be a powerful constraining force. Alongside strong political control, 
commercial and technological forces have transformed the whole environment into one 
that is unsuitable for the development and sustainability of critical journalism. In the 
external environment where critical journalism is practised, when political control remains 
the same or even becomes worse, what greatly matters is the power of the market and 
digital communication technologies. During the Jiang and Hu eras, the market acted as an 
opposing force against media control in most cases, although it could limit media autonomy 
too. Likewise, at that time, digital communication technologies were enhancing the capacity 
of critical journalism with their decentralised technical structure. However, in the Xi era, 
critical journalism benefits from neither the market nor digital communication technologies. 
The real impacts on critical journalism come not only from the tightening political control 
but also from market failure and the loss of reader markets which indirectly result from the 
wide application of digital communication technologies in general – and in particular the 
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capitalisation of digital communication – in Chinese society. The commercial and 
technological factors exacerbate the vulnerability of critical journalism in the face of media 
control.   
NOTES 
                                                          
1
 This study is based on publicly available materials and 32 interviews conducted between 2015 and 2016 with 
media professionals in three commercial newspapers in southern China. The analysis of both  helps the 
understanding of the state of critical journalism and the underlying contextual reasons, which show the joint 
influences of political, commercial and technological forces. Due to ethical considerations and the consent 
agreements with the participants, the names of the newspapers and of the participants have been anonymised. 
Newspaper A and Newspaper B, which are provincial commercial newspapers, were committed to critical 
reporting and investigative journalism in the 1990s and the early twenty-first century; and Newspaper C is 
owned by Newspaper A and is a municipal-level newspaper. All interviewees had more than five years’ 
experience as newspaper journalists or editors. The choice and analysis of the newspapers and the case of 
China follows the case-study approach suggested by Flyvbjerg (Flyvbjerg 2006).  
2
 In 2003, Sun Zhigang died in custody. He was detained for failing to present his identity documents on the 
street. The investigative reports published by the Southern Metropolitan Daily revealed that he was beaten to 
death. Facilitated by the internet, the reports triggered nationwide debates about the custody and repatriation 
system, which led to the abolition of the relevant constitution. This case can be seen the first case in which the 
internet played an important role in amplifying the effects of investigative reports and fostering public opinion. 
3
 ‘Urbanisation, Moving on Up’, The Economist, 22 March 2014, 64. 
4
 According to the South China Morning Post, an SUV drove into Tian’anmen Square and caught alight, which 
killed five people and injured 38 others.  http://www.scmp.com/topics/tiananmen-square-terror-attack  
5
 Five attackers took out knives and stabbed passengers indiscriminately. In all, 33 people were stabbed to 
death and at least 113 more were injured in the attack (Neil 2014). 
6
 Qian Yunhui was the village head who was petitioning against local government abuses. In 2010 he was 
crushed to death by a truck. His death was thought to be murder by local government and thus ignited online 
fury. Citizen activists mobilised online users and launched a civil investigation into his death in order to seek 
truth.  
7
 In 2011, Wukan villagers went to the streets to protest against the corruption of local officials in selling their 
farmland. Xue Jinbo, one of the village representatives, died in custody. His dealth led to the escalation of the 
protest. The protest however ended with a harmonious democratic election of village officials.  
8
 Tang Hui is a mother who was campaigning for harsher punishments for the men who kidnapped, raped and 
forced her teenage daughter into prostitution. That she was sent to labour camp for her campaign triggered 
public fury (Branigan 2012). 
9
 http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-02/20/c_1118106530.htm  
10
 https://www.ft.com/content/5bf8c860-0ecb-11e3-81ab-00144feabdc0  
11
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-36549266  
12
 http://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/26/asia/china-television-confessions/  
13
 http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2005-09/25/content_3538899.htm  
14
 In 2013, Liu Wei published a series of reports on Wang Lin, a qigong master, which were appraised as 
excellent investigative reports. In 2014, Liu Wei was awarded Investigative Journalist of the Year. However, Liu 
Wei was arrested by Jiangxi Police for illegally gaining national secrets in investigating Wang Lin in 2015 (Luo 
2015). Soon Liu Wei admitted guilt on CCTV.  
15




 http://www.cnnic.net.cn/hlwfzyj/hlwxzbg/hlwtjbg/201701/P020170123364672657408.pdf  
18
 Rewards means a function on social media tools such as WeChat. By using this function, readers can pay the 
authors whatever amount of money they would like to give.  
19
 http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-06/16/content_9855.htm  
20
 http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2008-11/09/nw.D110000renmrb_20081109_8-01.htm?div=-1  
21
 http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1343118 (accessed on March 29, 2017) 
22
 http://www.immomo.com/newsroom/14204.html  
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23
 From June 2015 to early 2016, China experienced a severe stock market crash. In July 2015, Wang Xiaolu 
published a report on the plan of the Chinese Securities and Futures Commission (CSFC) in Caijing magazine. 
The CSFC accused Wang of publishing fake information. Following this, Wang was taken to custody by police 
and placed under investigation. One month later Wang appeared on CCTV confessing he had collaborated with 
other people and made up and disseminated fake information, which negatively influenced the stock maket 
and was responsible for the stock market crash.  
24
 http://zhenhua.163.com/15/0110/12/AFJKOJ72000464F5.html  
25
 http://zhenhua.163.com/13/1223/18/9GQ2ORKM000464BM.html  
26
 http://epaper.oeeee.com/epaper/A/html/2017-04/22/content_24511.htm  
 
 
    References:  
 
Alexander, Jeffrey C., Elizabeth Butler Breese, and Marîa Luengo, eds. 2016. The Crisis of 
Journalism Reconsidered. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ashuri, Tamar. 2016. "When Online News was New: Online technology use and constitution 
of structures in journalism."  Journalism Studies 17 (3):301-318. 
Bandurski, David, and Martin Hala. 2010. Investigative Journalism in China: Eight Cases in 
Chinese Watchdog Journalism. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 
Branigan, Tania. 2012. "Outcry in China over mother sent to labour camp after daughter's 
rape " The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/16/china-tang-
hui-labour-camp. 
Cummings, Dean. 2014. "The DNA of a Television News Story: Technological Influences on 
TV News Production "  Electronic News 8 (3):198-215. 
Dai, Xiudian. 2002. "Towards a digital economy with Chinese characteristics?"  New Media 
Society 4 (2):141–162. 
de Burgh, Hugo 2003. "Kings without Crowns? The Re-Emergence of Investigative Journalism 
in China "  Media, Culture & Society 25 (6):801-820. 
Denyer, Simon. 2015. "Arrest of inspirational editor Shen Hao marks end of an era for 




Flyvbjerg, Bent. 2006. "Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research."  Qualitative 
Inquiry 12 (2):219-245. 
Guo, Quanzhong, and Jie Hu. 2017. "Analysis of 2016 media management."  Young 
Journalists (qingnian jizhe) December. 
Hassid, Jonathan. 2008. "Controlling the Chinese Media: An Uncertain Business."  Asian 
Survey 48 (3):414-430. 
Hassid, Jonathan Henry. 2010. "Pressing Back: The Struggle for Control Over China's 
Journalists." Phd, University of California. 
Hassid, Jonathan, and Maria Repnikova. 2016. "Why Chinese print journalists embrace the 
Internet."  Journalism 17 (7):882–898. 
Jing, Meng. 2017. "Pots of gold await in China’s gig economy: how mobile technology is 





                                                                                                                                                                                    
Keady, James. 2014. "An introduction to digital engagement in China."  Journal of Digital & 
Social Media Marketing 1 (4):349-364. 
Lam, Willy Wo-lap. 2015. Chinese politics in the era of Xi Jinping: renaissance, reform, or 
retrogression? New York and London: Routledge. 
Langley, Paul, and Andrew Leyshon. 2016. "Platform capitalism: The intermediation and 
capitalisation of digital economic circulation."  Finance and Society. 
Lee, Chin-chuan. 2005. "The Conception of Chinese Journalists: Ideological convergence and 
contestation." In Making Journalists: diverse models, global issues, edited by Hugo 
de Burgh, 107-126. Oxon, USA, Canada: Routledge. 
Lee, Chin-Chuan, Zhou He, and Yu Huang. 2006. "Chinese Party Publicity Inc.: conglomerated: 
the case of the Shenzhen Press Group."  Media, Culture & Society 28 (4): 581-602. 
Leibold, James. 2011. "Blogging alone: China, the internet, and the democratic illusion?"  
The Journal of Asian Studies 70 (04):1023-1041. 
Li, Ke, and Colin Sparks. 2016. "Chinese Newspapers and Investigative Reporting in the New 
Media Age."  Journalism Studies. doi: 10.1080/1461670X.2016.11929. 
Liebman, Benjamin L. 2005. "Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal 
System."  Columbia Law Review 105 (1):1-157. 
Luo, Jieqi. 2015. "The Police Bureau Directly Responsible for the Case of Liu Wei of the 
Southern Metropolitan Daily." Caixin. 
Macgregor, Phil. 2014. "Siren songs or path to salvation? Interpreting the visions of Web 
technology at a UK regional newspaper in crisis, 2006–2011."  Convergence: The 
International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies 20 (2):157-175. 
Meng, Bingchun. 2016. "Political scandal at the end of ideology? The mediatized politics of 
the Bo Xilai case."  Media, Culture & Society. 
Neil, Barry. 2014. "Kunming rail station attack: China horrified as mass stabbings leave 
dozens dead." The Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/02/china-mass-stabbings-yunnan-
kunming-rail-station. 
Örnebring, Henrik. 2010. "Technology and journalism-as-labour: Historical perspectives."  
Journalism 11 (1):57-74  
Pan, Zhongdang. 2000. "Spatial Configuration in institutional change: a case of Chin'a 
journalism reforms."  Journalism 1 (3):253-281. 
Paulussen, Steve. 2012. "Technology and the Transformation of News Work: Are Labor 
Conditions in (Online) Journalism Changing?" In The handbook of global online 
journalism, edited by Eugenia Siapera and Andreas Veglis, 192-208. West Sussex: 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
Pavlik, John. 2000. "The Impact of Technology on Journalism."  Jouranlism Studies 1 (2):229-
237. 
Peitz, Martin, and Tommaso Valletti. 2015. "Reassessing competition concerns in electronic 
communications markets."  Telecommunications Policy 39 (10):896-912. 
Ren, Mengshan. 2015. "The Accerelation of Quitting Journalism and Concerns about 
Journalistic Professionalism (meitiren jiashu lizhi yu xinwen zhuanye zhuyi yinyou)."  
Young Journalists (qingnian jizhe) 4:18-19. 
Repnikova, Maria. 2017. Media Politics in China: Improvising Power under Authoritarianism. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
17 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Stanyer, James. 2009. "Web 2.0 and the Transformation of News and Journalism: New 
Possibilities and Challenges in the Internet Age  " In Routledge Handbook of Internet 
Politics, edited by Andrew Chadwick and Philip N. Howard, 201-214. London and 
New York: Routledge. 
Svensson, Marina. 2017. "The rise and fall of investigative journalism in China: digital 
opportunities and political challenges."  Media, Culture & Society. doi: 
10.1177/0163443717690820. 
Svensson, Marina, Elin Saether, and Zhi'an Zhang, eds. 2014. Chinese Investigative 
Jouranlists' Dreams: Autonomy, agency and voice. Lanham, Boulder, New York, 
Toronto and Plymouth: LEXINGTON BOOKS. 
Tan, Barney, Shan L. Pan, Xianghua Lu, and Lihua Huang. 2015. "The Role of IS Capabilities in 
the Development of Multi-Sided Platforms: The Digital Ecosystem Strategy of 
Alibaba.com."  Journal of the Association for Informaiton Systems 16 (4):248-280. 
Tong, Jingrong. 2010. "The Crisis of the Centralized Media Control Theory: How Local Power 
Controls Media in China." Media Culture and Society 32 (6). 
Tong, Jingrong. 2011. Investigative Journalism in China: Journalism, Power, and Society. New 
York, London: Continuum. 
Tong, Jingrong. 2013. "The importance of place: an analysis of changes in investigative 
journalism in two Chinese provincial newspapers."  Journalism Practice 7 (1):1-16. 
Tong, Jingrong. 2015. Investigative Journalism, Environmental Problems and Modernisation 
in China. Edited by Anders Hansen and Stephen Depoe, Palgrave Studies in Media 
and Environmental Communication. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Tong, Jingrong, and Colin Sparks. 2009. "Investigative Journalism in China Today."  
Journalism Studies 10 (3). 
Waisbord, Silvio. 2007. "Democratic Journalism and “Statelessness”."  Political 
Communication 24 (2):115-129. doi: 10.1080/10584600701312837. 
Wang, Haiyan., and Francis L. F. Lee. 2014. "Research on Chinese Investigative Journalism, 
1978–2013: A Critical Review."  China Review Fall:215-251. 
Wang, Hui. 2003. China's New Order: Society, Politics, and Economy in Transition. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press. 
Wu, Xinxun, Guoming Yu, Yong Hu, and Xiaobing Han. 2014. "The implications of the 
changes in the Shanghai Press Group for understanding the transformation of 
Chinese media and the media-state relationship (cong shanghai baoye xindongxiang 
kan zhongguo chuanmeiye zhuanxing yu zhengmei guanxi)."  International 
Journalism (Guoji Xinwenjie) 2:58-68. 
Yang, Guobin. 2014. "The Return of Ideology and the Future of Chinese Internet Policy."  
Critical Studies in Media Communication 31 (2):109-113. doi: 
10.1080/15295036.2014.9138. 
Zelizer, Barbie, ed. 2009. The changing faces of journalism: tabloidization, technology and 
truthiness. London and New York: Routledge. 
Zhang, Shixin Ivy. 2009. "What's Wrong with Chinese Journalists? Addressing Journalistic 
Ethics in China Through a Case Study of the Beijing Youth Daily."  Journal of Mass 
Media Ethics 24 (2-3):173-188. doi: 10.1080/08900520902885301. 
Zhang, Xiaoling. 2011. "From Totalitarianism to Hegemony: the reconfiguration of the party-
state and the transformation of Chinese communication."  Journal of Contemporary 
China 20 (68):103-115. 
18 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Zhao, Suisheng. 2016. "Xi Jinping's Maoist Revival."  Journal of Democracy 27 (3):83-9. 
Zhao, Yuezhi. 2000. "Watchdogs on Party Leashes? Contexts and implications of 
investigative journalism in post-Deng China."  Journalism Studies 1 (2):577-597. 
Zhao, Yuezhi 1998. Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the 
Bottom Line. U.S.: The University of Illinois Press. 
Zhou, He. 2000. "Working with a Dying Ideology: dissonance and its reduction in Chinese 
journalism."  Journalism Studies 1 (4):599-616. 
 
 
 
 
